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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103(2)(j) (2009). Direct appeal of the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion
to Compel Arbitration is taken pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1 l-129(l)(a) (2008).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant/Appellant Charles

Bova5 M.D.'s ("Dr. Bova") Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation ("Dr.
Bova's Motion to Compel") by relying on extrinsic evidence in the form of declarations
submitted by Plaintiff/Appellee Glenna Stewart ("Plaintiff) to conclude that the
unambiguous language of the two Arbitration Agreements (the "Agreements") signed by
Plaintiff does not confirm that Plaintiff was verbally encourage to ask questions regarding
the Agreements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c)(ii).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration [R. 28-48], Dr.
Bova's Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Litigation [R. 52-64], Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Dr. Bova's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation [R. 110-115], Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Litigation [R. 148-152], at the June 15, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel
(the "First Hearing") [R. 336], at the October 19, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to
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Compel (the "Second Hearing") [R. 337], and at the December 105 2009 Hearing on Dr.
Bova's Motion to Compel and Dr. Bova's Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal (the
"ThirdHearing'')[R.338].
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a written contract is reviewed
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Cafe Rio, Inc. v Larkin-GiffordOverton, LLC, 2009 UT 27,\ 21, 207 P.3d 1235.
II.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the unambiguous

language of the arbitration agreements met all statutory and common law requirements for
a valid and enforceable contract, and for an arbitration agreement under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-3-421(l)(c)(ii) (2008).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration [R. 28-48]. Dr.
Bova's Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Litigation [R. 52-64], Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Dr. Bova's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation [R. 110-115], Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Litigation [R. 148-152], at the June 15, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel
(the "First Hearing") [R. 336], at the October 19, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to
Compel (the "Second Hearing") [R. 337], and at the December 10, 2009 Hearing on Dr.
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Bova's Motion to Compel and Dr. Bova's Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal (the
"ThkdHearing")[R.338].
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a written contract is reviewed
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Cafe Rio, Inc. v Larkin-GiffordOverton, LLC, 2009 UT 275 lj 21,207 P.3d 1235.
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 is of importance to this appeal,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below
This is a medical malpractice case arising out of lumbar nerve root injection
procedure (the "Procedure") performed by Dr. Bova on the Plaintiff on April 16, 2008.
Prior to the Procedure, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement (the "April 16th
Agreement') agreeing to arbitrate all claims related to the care and treatment provided by
Dr. Bova. The day after the Procedure, on April 17,2008, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Bova
for a follow-up appointment and signed a second arbitration agreement (the "April 17th
Agreement"). The April 16th and 17th Agreements are identical. In response to Plaintiffs
Complaint and prior to any other responsive pleadings being filed, Dr. Bova filed his
Motion to Compel, joined by Pioneer Valley Hospital, which Plaintiff opposed.
Arguments on Dr. Bova's Motion were heard on three different dates: (1) June 15, 2009;
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(2) October 19, 2009; and (3) December 10, 2009. Judge Kennedy entered an order on
December 10, 2009 denying Dr. Bova's Motion on the basis that Plaintiffs declarations
demonstrated that she was not verbally encouraged to ask questions regarding the
Agreements in contravention of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3 -421(1 )(c)(ii) (2008). This
appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dr. Bova is a pain management physician licensed to practice medicine in the State
of Utah. [R. 1]. On April 16, 2008, Dr. Bova performed the Procedure on the Plaintiff.
[R. 2]. Prior to the Procedure, the Plaintiff signed the April 16th Agreement.1 [R. 14].
Plaintiff was accompanied by her daughter, a registered nurse who is familiar with health
care providers having their patients sign arbitration agreements. [R. 45]. Under the terms
of the April 16th Agreement, the Plaintiff agreed to resolve any claim for medical
malpractice arising out of the care rendered by Dr. Bova by mediation or arbitration.
[Addendum B at Art. 3]. The April 16th Agreement gives the Plaintiff the unilateral right
to rescind the Agreement within 10 days of signing. [Id. at Art. 7.BJ. The Agreement
includes Plaintiffs acknowledgment that:
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this
Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions and have my
questions answered. I understand that any Claims I might
have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process

1

A true and correct copy of the April 16th Agreement is attached hereto as
Addendum B.
4

in this Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or
jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in
which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for
arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement
renews each year unless cancelled before the renewal date. I
understand that I can decline to enter into the Agreement and
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this
Agreement within 10 days of signing it.
[Id. at Art. 9]. The Agreement also contains Plaintiffs acknowledgment that "I have
received a copy of this document." [Id. at Art. 10]. The day after the procedure, on April
17, 2008, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Bova for a follow-up appointment and signed the
April 17th Agreement.2 [R. 59]. The April 16th and 17th Agreements are identical.
[Compare Addendum B with Addendum C].
By way of Complaint dated January 7,2009, Plaintiff sued Dr. Bova and Pioneer
Valley Hospital claiming medical malpractice for injury allegedly arising out of the April
16, 2008 Procedure. [R. 1-6]. Dr. Bova filed his Motion to Compel on February 18,
2009 requesting that the trial court compel arbitration, joined by Pioneer Valley Hospital,
pursuant to the terms of the April 16th Agreement. [R. 10-12]. On March 13, 2009,
Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion. [R. 28-48].
Attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition were two declarations—one by the
Plaintiff, and the other by her daughter—asserting that the Plaintiff was not verbally
encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement, and that she did not receive a copy

2

A true and correct copy of the April 17th Agreement is attached hereto as
Addendum C.
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of the Agreement. [R. 40-48]. Based on these declarations, Plaintiff argued that the April
16th Agreement was procedurally unconscionable because she was not verbally
encouraged to ask questions as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(1 )(c)(ii). [R. 2837].
Dr. Bova and Pioneer Valley Hospital responded by arguing that Plaintiffs
declarations were impermissible parol evidence and should not be considered by the
Court because the terms of the April 16th Agreement were unambiguous. [R. 52-60]. Dr.
Bova also argued that the execution of the April 16th Agreement was not procedurally
unconscionable under common law, and that Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgment
that she "had the right to ask questions and have my questions answered*' demonstrates
that the execution of the Agreement was in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3422(1 )(c)(ii). [Id.] Dr. Bova farther argued that Plaintiff executed an identical agreement
the day after she executed the April 16th Agreement (i.e., the April 17th Agreement) which
further demonstrates Plaintiffs understanding of the terms of the April 16th Agreement,
and that the April 16th Agreement was validly executed under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3421 and common law principles of procedural unconscionability. [Id.]
Arguments on Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel were heard by the Honorable John
Paul Kennedy on three different occasions: during the first hearing on June 15, 2009 [R.
336]: during the second hearing on October 19. 2009 [R. 337]; and during the third
hearing on December 10, 2009. [R. 338]. The purpose of the second, October 19, 2009
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hearing was to hear arguments regarding the dates the Agreements were signed by
Plaintiff. [R. 336, p. 33; R. 337, p. 1]. Prior to the second hearing, the parties submitted
Supplemental Memoranda regarding when the Agreements were signed by Plaintiff. [R.
110-131; 148-152]. Dr. Bova submitted two declarations with his Supplemental
Memorandum for the limited purpose of establishing the dates the Agreements were
signed by Plaintiff. [R. 110-131; 337, pp. 22-23; R. 338, p. 6]. Judge Kennedy ultimately
declined to issue a ruling on when the Agreements were signed by Plaintiff. [R. 349353]. The purpose of the third, December 10, 2009 hearing was to: (1) correct the date
Judge Kennedy entered his Memorandum and Order denying Dr. Bova's Motion to
Compel [R. 338, pp. 1-12]; and (2) hear arguments on Defendant's Joint Motion to Stay
Litigation Pending Appeal [R. 338, pp. 12-14]. Judge Kennedy corrected the date he
entered his Memorandum and Order denying Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel to reflect its
entry on December 10, 2009. [R. 349-353; 358-359]. Judge Kennedy also summarily
denied Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay Litigation pending appeal. [R. 338, pp. 12-14; R.
358-359].
Ultimately, by Memorandum and Order dated December 10, 2009, Judge Kennedy
denied Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel on the bases that: (1) Plaintiffs declarations
demonstrated that she was not verbally encouraged to ask questions regarding the
Agreement as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c)(ii); and (2) Plaintiffs
acknowledgment in the Agreements that she "had the right to ask questions and have my
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questions answered" does not satisfy the requirement that she be verbally encouraged to
ask questions pursuant to § 78B-3-421(1 )(c)(ii). [R. 349-352]. Judge Kennedy did not
find that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Agreements. [Id.] Judge Kennedy further
clarified his ruling in his Memorandum and Order for Hearing on Defendants' Joint
Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal by stating: ;*[t]he arbitration agreements at
issue were not validly executed as a matter of law because the Court finds that the
plaintiff was not verbally encouraged as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c)."
[R. 358-359].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The April 16th Agreement is valid and enforceable under both Utah Code

Ann. § 78B-3-421, and Utah contract law. First, the Agreement complies with the
requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 (2008) to create a valid and
enforceable physician/patient arbitration agreement. Although Plaintiff contends that
only one of several requirements set forth in § 78B-3-421 wras not met. she cannot dispute
that the underlying purpose of the statute was satisfied, namely, that she understood the
terms of the April 16th Agreement when she signed it. Second, under well-established
Utah contract law, Plaintiff cannot claim ignorance of the Agreement's terms after she
signed it to escape its enforcement. Third, the trial court erred in relying on parol
evidence in the form of Plaintiff s declarations to conclude that a single statutory
requirement in § 78B-3-421 was not met. Finally, the execution of the Agreement was
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not procedurally unconscionable because Plaintiff: (1) received a copy of the Agreement;
(2) had the unrestricted opportunity to rescind it within ten days of signing it; (3) executed
an identical Agreement a day later; and (4) was accompanied by her daughter—a nurse
with knowledge of and experience with patients signing arbitration agreements—when
she executed the April 16th Agreement.
II.

The trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 is incorrect

and undermines the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. One of the primary
purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to "expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402 (2008). Arbitration furthers this goal
by providing an expeditious inexpensive method to resolve disputes. If, however, health
care providers are required to prove by extrinsic evidence that a patient has been verbally
encouraged to read and sign an arbitration agreement, the inevitable result will be far
fewer arbitrations. This result undermines both the purpose of the statute and longstanding Utah policy in favor of arbitration. Given that Plaintiff has acknowledged that
she was given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the agreement and understood
its terms and conditions, legislative intent and public policy would best be served by
enforcing the Arbitration Agreement.

9

ARGUMENT
L

THE APRIL 16TH AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE UNDER
BOTH UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421, AND UTAH CONTRACT LAW.
Under Utah law, ;;[a] party claiming unconscionability bears a heavy burden."

Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998); accord Resource
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). In opposing Dr.
Bova's Motion to Compel, Plaintiff argued that the execution of the April 16th Agreement
was procedurally unconscionable because she was not verbally encouraged to ask
questions regarding the Agreement prior to signing it in contravention of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-3-421 (2008). [R. 28-48J.3 In support of her arguments, Plaintiff submitted two
declarations in which Plaintiff and her daughter assert that Plaintiff was not verbally
encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement. [Id.] Plaintiff does not dispute,
however, her unambiguous acknowledgments that she understood the Agreement's terms.
[Id.] Despite Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgments that she knew what she was
signing, the trial court relied on Plaintiffs declarations to find that the April 16th
Agreement was not enforceable because a single requirement of § 78B-3-421 had not
been met. [R. 349-352]. The trial court erred in reaching this conclusion because it

3

Significantly, Plaintiff does not claim that the April 16th Agreement is
substantively unconscionable. [R. 28-48]. While substantive unconscionability may alone
support a finding of unconscionability, ''procedural unconscionability without any
substantive imbalance will rarely render a contract unconscionable.55 Ryan, 927 P.2d at
402. Thus, Plaintiffs already heavy burden to demonstrate unconscionability7 is greatly
increased.
10

ignored the plain and unambiguous language of the Agreement and well-established Utah
contract law directly on point. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and
compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims pursuant to the terms of the April 16th Agreement.
A.

The Agreement Complies with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421.

The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized "the strong public policy in favor of
arbitration as an approved, practical and inexpensive means of settling disputes and
easing court congestion." Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983);
accord Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 368 (Utah 1992). Indeed,
according to the Utah Supreme Court, "if there is any question as to whether the parties
agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration or litigation... we interpret the
agreement keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration." Central Florida
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, \ 16, 40 P.3d 599.
One of the stated purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to "provide
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(3) (2008). Consistent with this purpose, in 1999 the Utah
legislature amended the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and codified the enforceability
of physician-patient arbitration agreements as favored public policy. The statute specifies
agreement terms and includes the information that must be provided to the patient
regarding arbitration, how that information is to be provided to the patient, and an
acknowledgment by the patient that she received the information. See Utah Code Ann. §
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78B-3-421(l) (2008). The level of detail embodied in the statute reveals the legislature's
intent to ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements entered into
between physicians and their patients that meet the requirements of the statute. Indeed,
the purpose of the statute is to avoid the very claims of procedural unconscionability
asserted by Plaintiff.
Comparison of the Agreement with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3421(l)(a) and (b) demonstrates that the Agreement complies with the legislativelyestablished requirements to create a presumptively valid and enforceable physicianpatient arbitration agreement. (Compare Addendum A, with Addendum B). The only
deviations from the statutory requirements alleged by Plaintiff are that: (1) she was not
verbally encouraged to read the Agreement and ask questions about it and (2) she did not
receive a copy of the Agreement.4 [R. 28-48]. Plaintiffs allegations are specious at best.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs allegations are directly contradicted by her own
unambiguous acknowledgments that she received a copy of the Agreement, understood its
terms and was given the opportunity to ask questions. [Addendum B at Art. 9]. These
acknowledgments plainly demonstrate that the underlying purpose of the statutory
requirements were met, namely, that she be given an opportunity to understand what she

4

Regarding the second allegation, the trial court did not address whether Plaintiff
received a copy of the April 16tn Agreement. Instead, the trial court's decision was based
solely on the issue of whether she wras verbally encouraged to read and ask questions
regarding the Agreement.
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was signing to avoid any issues of procedural unconscionability. Indeed, Plaintiff does
not contradict any of her other, more significant acknowledgments that she understood
her claims would be arbitrated, and understood the role of the arbitrators and how they
would be selected. [R. 28-48]. It is simply nonsensical to hold an agreement
unenforceable on the basis that only one of many statutory requirements designed to
prevent misunderstanding of the terms of an Agreement was not met, when the Plaintiff
clearly acknowledges that she understood the terms of the Agreement.
The trial court, however, concluded that the lack of evidence that the Plaintiff be
verbally encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement rendered the entire
Agreement unenforceable. [R.349-352]. The trial court's conclusion not only ignores the
underlying purpose of the statute and the policy favoring arbitration, it disregards wellestablished contract law.5
B.

Utah Contract Law Prohibits Plaintiffs After-the-Fact Attempt to
Undo Her Agreement

In 1996 the Utah Supreme Court made clear that arbitration agreements are valid
and enforceable in the physician-patient context, stating:
We emphasize preliminarily that arbitration agreements are
favored in Utah and that no public policy requires such
agreements to be subject to a different analysis when they are
between physicians and patients. They are enforceable if they
meet the standards applicable to all contracts.

5

The purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and Utah policy favoring
arbitration are discussed in more detail in Section II.
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Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). Under well-established Utah contract
law, a party to a contract is bound to all contract provisions and. absent fraud or mistake,
cannot assert lack of understanding to avoid the contract. Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, ^f
12, 982 P.2d 578. Specifically, "a signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of
the contract and thereby escape liability." Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation,
Inc., 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Each party has the burden to understand
the terms of a contract before he affixes his signature to it and may not thereafter assert
his ignorance as a defense/' Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985). "In Utah, contracts mean what they say, and
parties will be bound by them." Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 906 n.l
(Utah 1995); John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207-1208
(Utah 1987). In other words, "a person who signs a contract must be presumed to have
read, understood and assented to i t . . . . " C.J.S. Contracts § 705 (2010). "The fact that a
contracting party fails to read papers or does not have someone else read them to him or
her does not rebut the presumption." Id.
Overlaid on these axioms of Utah contract law are Plaintiffs unambiguous
acknowledgments that:
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this
Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions and have my
questions answered. I understand that any Claims I might
have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process
in this Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or
jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in
14

which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for
arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement
renews each year unless cancelled before the renewal date. I
understand that I can decline to enter into the Agreement and
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this
Agreement within 10 days of signing it.
[Addendum B at Art. 9]. Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the April 16th
Agreement, she does not contend the terms are ambiguous, and she does not allege fraud
or mistake relating to this Agreement. [R. 28-48]. Thus, under well-established Utah law
and the plain language of the Agreement, Plaintiff is deemed to have understood the
terms of the Agreement and any claim of procedural unconscionability is without merit.
Plaintiffs claims of ignorance are not a valid defense; she is bound by the terms of the
Agreement that she signed on two occasions and is estopped from claiming otherwise.
C.

Plaintiffs Declarations Are Inadmissible Parol Evidence and Should
Not Be Applied to Contradict Plaintiffs Unambiguous
Acknowledgments.

The purpose of the parol evidence rule is "to limit the ability of the fmder of fact
(the jury) to believe testimony contradicting integrated writings." Ward v. Intermoiintain
Farmers Ass., 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995) (quoting 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 572C (Supp. 1994)). Consistent with this axiom of contract law, this Court
has long held that "parol evidence is . . . not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and
unambiguous terms of the contract." DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielson, 2009 UT App 269,
% 8, 220 P.3d 178 (citing Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ^f 11, 182 P.3d
326).
15

A trial court may not consider parol evidence without first finding an ambiguity in
the language of the contract. Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, ^j 12, 209 P.3d 428.
U

A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable

interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other facial
deficiencies;' Park v. Stanford, 2009 UT App 307, % 10, 221 P.3d 877 (quoting Daines v.
Vincent, 2008 UT 51, If 25, 1490 P.3d 1269). If the contract is unambiguous, the trial
court may not consider parol evidence and must interpret the contract solely from the
plain meaning of the contractual language. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gijford-Overton,
LLC, 2009 UT 27, ^ 25, 207 P.3d 1235. Indeed, ';[o]nly if the language of the contract is
ambiguous will [the Court] consider extrinsic evidence/' Id.
The sole basis of the trial court's determination that Plaintiff wras not verballv
encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement is Plaintiffs self serving, after-thefact declaration that she was not verbally encouraged to ask questions. [R. 349-352].
Based on this parol evidence (and the lack of contradicting parol evidence submitted by
Dr. Bova), the trial court found that "there is no proof that defendant 'verbally
encouraged' the patient as required by statute" and ruled that the April 16th Agreement
was unenforceable. [R. 351]. The trial court's reliance on Plaintiffs declaration to fmd
the Agreement unenforceable is reversible error.
As an initial matter, the trial court failed to find any ambiguity in the language of
the April 16th Agreement. [R. 349-352]. That is because it could not do so. There is no
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ambiguity in the terms of the Agreement, or in Plaintiffs acknowledgment that she
understood those terms. Indeed, a cursory reading of the plain language of the Agreement
illustrates that Plaintiff knew what she was signing. As a result, the trial court should not
have even considered Plaintiffs declaration, let alone relied on it, in determining whether
the April 16th Agreement satisfied the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421.
Flores, 2009 UT App at f 12. The trial court should be reversed for this reason alone.
In addition, it is undisputable that Plaintiff submitted her declarations to contradict
her unambiguous acknowledgments that she understood the terms of the Agreement. [R.
28-48]. Indeed, the underlying premise of her procedural unconscionability claim is that
she did not understand what she was signing. Ostensibly recognizing that all of the other
requirements of § 78B-3-421 were met, Plaintiff submitted her declarations in the hope
that the trial court would focus on the single requirement that she be verbally encouraged
to ask questions, and ignore her unambiguous acknowledgments that she understood what
she was signing. And that is exactly what the trial court did. Although veiled in the
failure to satisfy strict statutory mandate, the trial court's reliance on Plaintiffs parol
evidence resulted in eviscerating the plain, unambiguous language of the Agreement
demonstrating that Plaintiff understood the terms of the Agreement. Consistent with this
Court's long standing precedent, the trial court's reliance on parol evidence should not be
condoned. DCHHoldings, LLC, 2009 UT App at \ 8.
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B.

lhe Utah Supreme Court5 s Holding in Sosa Compels Enforcement of
the April 16th Agreement

In Sosa v. Pernios, the plaintiff argued that the execution of an arbitration
agreement was procedurally unconscionable because she was presented with the
agreement less than an hour prior to surgery when she was in an apprehensive and
nervous condition. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362. Like the instant case, the plaintiff in Sosa also
argued that no one undertook to explain the document to her, and that she felt "rushed and
hurried" by the manner of its presentation. Id.
The majority of the Sosa court concluded that the execution of the agreement
wrould not be procedurally unconscionable if: (1) the plaintiff was given a signed copy of
the agreement following her surgery, and (2) she was not precluded from revoking the
agreement within the fourteen day revocation period. Id at 365. The majority reasoned
that if the plaintiff was aware of complications immediately following the surgery,
"fourteen days was sufficient time for her to read and understand the agreement's
unconditional revocation clause. During this fourteen day period, she would not have
been forced to make a decision in a hurried, rushed, or anxious state, and her decision to
revoke or not would have been a meaningful choice." Id. at 364. Indeed, the majority in
Sosa made clear that the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the
agreement did not demonstrate that ;;the whole transaction was tainted with procedural
unconscionabilitv so as to render the entire agreement null and void." Id. at 365.
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Like the majority of the Supreme Court in Sosa, this Court should find that
Plaintiffs execution of the April 16th Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable.
Plaintiff specifically acknowledged receiving a signed copy of the Agreement.
[Addendum B at Art. 10]. Moreover, in specific compliance with Utah Code Ann. §
78B-3-421, the Agreement gave Plaintiff the unfettered and unilateral right to revoke the
Agreement within ten days of signing it. [Addendum B at Art. 9]. Thus, under Sosa,
Plaintiffs acknowledgment that she received a copy of the Agreement and that it
contained an easily understandable clause affording her the right to unilaterally revoke the
Agreement within ten days precludes a determination that it is void because of alleged
defects in procedure in forming the Agreement. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 365.
In addition to the facts outlined in Sosa, there are other facts present in this case
which demonstrate that the execution of the April 16th Agreement was not procedurally
unconscionable. Plaintiffs execution of an identical agreement a day later (i.e., the April
17th Agreement) provided her with yet another opportunity to understand the terms of the
April 16th Agreement, and if she chose not to enter into it, she could have rescinded it.
[Addendum C]. Further, Plaintiffs multiple acknowledgments in a two day period of
understanding the Agreement's terms renders her allegations to the contrary hollow. A
second fact weighing against a finding of procedural unconscionability is that Plaintiff
was accompanied by her daughter when she executed the April 16th Agreement. [R. 29].
Her daughter is a nurse and is familiar with health care providers such as Dr. Bova having
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their patients sign documents, including arbitration agreements, prior to rendering care.
[Id.] Thus, not only was there another person present to aid Plaintiff in understanding
what she was signing, this person had specific knowledge and experience with the very
documents Plaintiff was signing. These facts, coupled with the fact that Plaintiff received
a copy of the April 16th Agreement (and the April 17th Agreement) and had the ability to
rescind it within ten days, negate Plaintiffs claim of procedural unconscionability.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UCA §78B«3-421 IS
INCORRECT AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSE OF THE HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT.
The trial court requires that Dr. Bova prove through extrinsic evidence that

Plaintiff was verbally encouraged to read the Arbitration Agreement and ask questions.
Yet, other than the suggestion that Dr. Bova could have filed an affidavit, the trial court
did not explain how Dr. Bova could have, or should have, proved verbal encouragement.
The reality is that it is nearly impossible for Dr. Bova, by extrinsic evidence, to prove that
a verbal exchange took place in wilich Plaintiff was encouraged to read and sign the
Arbitration Agreement. The problem is not unique to this case. The trial court sets up a
scenario in w7hich health care providers are saddled with a burden of proof that is simply
impossible to meet. If health care providers are required to prove by extrinsic evidence
that a patient has been verbally encouraged to read and sign an arbitration agreement the
inevitable result will be that far fewer arbitration agreements will be enforced. This result
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undermines both the purpose of the statute and long-standing Utah policy in favor of
arbitration.
The provision requiring verbal encouragement must be reviewed within the
context of the overall purpose of the statute. The Legislature clearly intended to
encourage arbitration agreements in the health care context; at the same time, the
Legislature wanted to ensure that patients have the opportunity to read and understand
such agreements. Here, the Plaintiff has acknowledged on two occasions that she
understood the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and was given the opportunity to ask
questions. While there is no specific extrinsic evidence that Plaintiff was verbally
encouraged, it is clear that the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled in this case.
Requiring extrinsic evidence of verbal encouragement after a plaintiff has admitted that
she understood the arbitration agreement and was given the opportunity to ask questions
is simply nonsensical.
A-

The Trial Court's Interpretation of UCA § 78B-3-421 is Unreasonable
and Would Result in Fewer Arbitrations

The rules of statutory interpretation "require the court to give effect to the intent of
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Miller,
2008 UT 61, \ 18, 193 P.3d 92. Specific language of statutory provisions should not be
interpreted in a manner that would "undermine the purpose of the statute." R&R Indus.
Park LLC. v. Utah Property and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass% 2008 UT 80, \ 36, 199 P.3d
917. Additionally, statutes "must be interpreted in a reasonable way, with an eye toward
21

the construction that will achieve the best results in practical application, will avoid
unacceptable consequences, and will be consistent with sound public policy." Derhridge
v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(internal citations
and quotations omitted). See also Wasatch County v. Tax Com 'n, 2009 UT App. 221, %
13 217 P.3d 270 (noting that statutes should be interpreted with any eye toward "the
effect it will have in practical application"). "When the court finds a statutory provision
that causes doubt or uncertainty7 in its application, the court must analyze the act in its
entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and
purpose." Miller, 2008 UT at ^ 19 (quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^34, 52 P.3d 1210
(2003).
One of the primary purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to
"expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." UCA § 78B-3-402. Arbitration
furthers this goal by "providing a method more expeditious and less expensive than the
court system for the resolution of disputes." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, \ 17, 99
P.3d 842 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15
P.2d 353, 356 (1932) ("[Arbitration is favored in the law as a speedy and inexpensive
method of adjudicating difference.") Indeed, the Legislature's desire to encourage
arbitration in the medical malpractice context is evidenced by the inclusion of § 78B-3421 in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
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The nature of the statute itself evidences the Legislature's desire to encourage
arbitration. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 specifies mandatory agreement terms and
includes the information that must be provided to the patient regarding arbitration, how
that information is to be provided to the patient, and an acknowledgment by the patient
that she received the information. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l) (2008). Rather
than discouraging arbitration agreements between health care providers and patients, the
level of detail found in the statute displays the Legislature's intent to ensure the
enforceability of arbitration agreements that meet the requirements of the statute. Indeed,
the statute is designed to prevent patients from nullifying valid agreements through claims
of ignorance. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(4) (2008).
The trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 (2008) undermines
the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act by making it much more difficult
for health care providers to enforce arbitration agreements. The trial court interprets the
statute as requiring a health care provider to prove, by extrinsic evidence, that he verbally
encouraged the patient to ask questions. [R. 231]. The statute, however, places no such
affirmative burden on the health care provider. The statute is similarly silent as to how a
health care provider could prove that such a verbal exchange occurred. Nonetheless, the
trial court reads into the statute the requirement of extrinsic evidence to prove verbal
encouragement. Absent extrinsic proof of verbal encouragement, the trial court reasons
that an arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable. [R. 349-52].
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The burden of proving verbal encouragement by extrinsic evidence is nearly
impossible to meet. Absent a recording of the conversation, which is certainly not
feasible, there is no way to positively prove that such a verbal exchange occurred.6 The
only conceivable extrinsic evidence that could be offered is an affidavit by the health care
provider. However, the patient could simply counter with her own affidavit. The
unavoidable result of the trial court's analysis would be dueling affidavits. [R. 230-34].
This would put the trial court in the untenable position of weighing the credibility of
testimony in a game of he said she said. [R. 228-29]. This is just the type of factual
dispute that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 w7as designed to avoid.
Moreover, given the number of patients that pass through physicians' offices and
hospitals, it would be unlikely that a health care provider w7ould remember giving a
specific patient verbal encouragement. In most cases, at best, the health provider would
only be able to provide an affidavit stating that it is his policy or practice to provide such
verbal encouragement. This affidavit of policy or practice would then be wreighed against
a plaintiffs affidavit specifically denying verbal encouragement The trial court would
likely give more wreight to the plaintiffs more specific affidavit. The result would be a
system in which an otherwise statutorily compliant and binding arbitration agreement

6

Under the trial court's analysis, even a provision in the arbitration agreement
specifically stating that the patient acknowledges that she was verbally encouraged to ask
questions is not sufficient because the patient could simply deny that she ever read the
agreement. [R. 231]. Thus, under the Trial Court's analysis, there would be no way for
health care providers to provide verbal encouragement absent a recording.
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could be easily invalidated by a simple affidavit by the patient. The result would be far
fewer arbitrations, thus undermining one of the key purposes of the Health Care
Malpractice Act.
B.

Legislative Intent Would Best be Served by Enforcing the Arbitration
Agreement

The trial court denied Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration on the basis that
"neither of the arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff are enforceable because Dr.
Bova failed to present evidence that he verbally encouraged Plaintiff to ask questions
about the arbitration agreement." [R. 349-52]. The trial court's analysis, however,
ignores the fact that the purpose of § 78B-3-421, indeed the purpose of the verbal
encouragement provision, was already fulfilled in this case.
The statute states that "the patient shall be verbally encouraged to : (i) read the
written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and (ii)
ask any questions." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c) (2008). The purpose of the
verbal encouragement provision is obvious, the legislature intended that a patient be
given an opportunity to read and understand the arbitration agreement.
In this case, Plaintiff signed an Agreement affirming that she was given the
opportunity to ask questions and that she understood the terms of the Agreement.
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this Agreement. I have
had the right to ask questions and have my questions answered. I
understand that any Claims I might have must be resolved through the
dispute resolution process in this Agreement instead of having them heard
by a judge or jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in
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which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for arbitration
related costs. I understand that this Agreement renews each year unless
cancelled before the renewal date. I understand that I can decline to enter
into the Agreement and still receive health care. I understand that I can
rescind this Agreement within 10 days of signing it.
[Addendum B at Art. 9]. These acknowledgments plainly demonstrate that the purpose
of the verbal encouragement provision was met, namely, that Plaintiff was given an
opportunity to understand wrhat she was signing, thereby avoiding any issues of
procedural unconscionability. Indeed, Plaintiff expressly acknowledged that she
understood the terms of the arbitration agreement. It is simply nonsensical to hold the
agreement unenforceable on the basis that there is no extrinsic evidence of verbal
encouragement to ask questions wrhen the Plaintiff clearly acknowledges in writing that
she was given the opportunity to ask questions and, more importantly, that she understood
the terms of the Agreement.
Under Utah contract construction policy, this arbitration agreement, including the
acknowledgements quoted above, should be construed in favor of arbitration. See
Central Florida Investments Inc. v Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, ^16. According to
the Utah policy favoring arbitration, and viewing the statutory language as a whole, the
Agreement in this case was validly executed, and the parties are bound by its terms to
submit to arbitration.
CONCLUSION
The April 16th Agreement is valid and enforceable under both Utah statutory7
mandate, and Utah contract law. Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgments clearly
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demonstrate that she understood the terms of the Agreement negating her claims of
procedural unconscionability. Plaintiff also received a copy of the Agreement and could
have rescinded it within ten days of signing it if she disagreed with its terms.
Fundamentally, Plaintiff had a meaningful choice in entering into the Agreement. The
trial court erred when it disregarded these plain facts, the policy favoring arbitration, and
Utah contract law when it relied on Plaintiffs declarations to find the Agreement
unenforceable. Indeed, the trial court's strict interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3421 undermines the purpose of the statute and the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and order Plaintiff to arbitrate her
claims pursuant to the terms of the April 16th Agreement.
Respectfully submitted this^J_ day of June, 2010.
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ADDENDUM
1

78B-3-421. Arbitration agreements,
(1) After May 2,1999? for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health
care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been
previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on:
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the claim
heard by a judge or jury;
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected under the
agreement;
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement;
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still receive health
care if Subsection (3) applies;
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is canceled in
writing before the renewal date;
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement answered;
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within 10 days of signing the
agreement; and
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute prior to the arbitration of
the dispute;
(b) the agreement shall require that:
(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii), a panel of three arbitrators shall be
selected as follows:
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming damages;
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and
(C) a third arbitrator:
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the health care provider; or
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, the other two
arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by
the state or federal courts of Utah; or
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected;
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78B-3-416 to appear before a hearing
panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 10 days of signing the
agreement;
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automatically
renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient or health care
provider before the renewal date;
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel;
(vii) the agreement only apply to:
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, provided that the
agreement may allow a person who would be a proper party in court to participate in an
arbitration proceeding;
(B) the claim of:
(I) a person who signed the agreement;
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); and

(HI) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12
monthsfromthe date the agreement is signed; and
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party7 to the contract if the sole basis for the claim
is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to:
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration
agreement; and
(ii) ask any questions.
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall:
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the patient before an
arbitration hearing is commenced:
(i) mandatory mediation;
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability7 and damages stages of
an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and
(hi) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement against the provider in the
appropriate district court.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care on the sole
basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a binding
arbitration agreement with a health care provider.
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a binding
arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the
patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1)
unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; or
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts offraudulentmisrepresentation or
fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3,1999.
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78B-3-406(6), except a person
temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on
behalf of a patient.
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.

ADDENDUM
2

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
article 1 Dispute KesotetfoB
6y signbg* ihis Agreement ("Agreement") we are agreeing to revive any Claim for medical malpractice by the disp
resolution process described in this Agreement* Under this Agreement, you can pursue yew Claim and seek damag?
you are waiving yoii£ right to have it decided by a judge or jury*
Article! Definitions
A.
The tana "we** "parties" or "us" means you. (the Patient), and the Provider.
B.
The term "Claim" means one or more Istolpractice Actions defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
(Utah Code 7S-14-5(15))- Each party may use anytegalproceasto resolve nonmedical malpractice claims.
Q
Tie term ^Provider* means the physician, group or clinic and their employees, partners, associates, agents,
successors and estates.
D.
The term patient" or '"you" means:
(1} you attd any person who mpkes a Claim for care givan to YOU* such as your heirs, year spouse, dill drea,
parents or legal representatives, AND
(2) your unborn child or newborn child for care provided during the 12 mon&a immediately following
(he date yon sign this Agreement,, or any person who-makes a Claim for ease given to that unborn ornewbon
chili
Ariic!e3 Plspftte Regoigtioa Options
Mflflfrdg, Avftfrfote ffflF PfepPfc Rpg9h^9R> We agree to resolve any Claim by:
(1)
working dsreefly with each oiher to fry andfinda solution that resolves the Claim, OR
(2)
using non-binding mediation (each of us vriU bear one»hatf of the costs); OR
(3)
using bindfiog arbitration as deacribed in this Agreement
Von may choose to use any or all of these methods to reaoJve your Claim.
JLcgafCotqis^l Eacbofiwiriiiycfcoose
tober^
resolution process* bat each of us will pay the fees-and costs of our own attorney.
Arbitration ~ Final Resolution. Ifworking with the Provider or using non-biftding mediation does no*
resolve year Claim, we agree that your CUdxn wittbe.ieaolved through binding arbitration. We both agree
that the decision reached m binding arbitration will be final,
rtide4 How to Arbitrate a Claim
>fotieet ToxnafceaClaimiindwthis Agreement, mail a written notice to the Provider hy certified mail that
briefly describes the natuxe of your Claim (the •"Notice"). If the Notice is seat to the Provider by certified mail
wiQ suspend (toll) the applicable statute of limitations during die dispute resolution process described in this
Agreement.
Ajrbitmfors. Within 30 days of receiving fee Notice* the Provider will contact you* If yon and the Provider
cannot resolve the Claim hy working together orfturoughmediation, we wiff start the process of choosing
arbitrator*. There will be three arbrtratora, Unless wc agree that a single arbitrator amy resolve the Ctatnu
(1)
APT*fo*ted Arbitrator?T "You will appoint an arbitrator of your choosing and all Providers will jointly
appoint an arbitrator of their choosing.
(2) fcmgv~Sclested Arbitrator. You and the Providers) will then jointly appoint an-arbitrator. (She "Jointly'Selected Arbitrate***). If you and 1&6 PrtfvMfcr(s) caxtoot agree upon a ^ointty-Seleked.
Arbitrate fh^ arbitrators appohrted*by eacfcof the pWties will choose fee Jointly-Selected Aa&itrator fro
list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah. If the aAitraiorscaBiiot
agree on n Jointly-Selected Arbitrator, either or both of us may reqi&est fbat a Utah court select an indfvk
from the lists described above. Eadh party will pay their own fees and costs in such an action. The Joint*
Selected Arbitrator will preside over the arbitration hearing and ha*e all other powers of an arbitrator as
forth in the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act;
Arbitration Expenses. You will pay fee fees and costs of the arbitrator you appoint and the ProvlderC*)- wtii
pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator the Providers) appoints. Each of us will also pay one-half of file fees
and expenses of die loint!y*Selected Aifcitrator sad any other expenses of the arbitration panel
Final and Binding Decision, A majority of the three arbitrators will make a final decision on the Claim. The
decision shaU be consistent with the. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
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ADDENDUM
3

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
r t i c l e l Dispute Resolution
' signing tbis Agreement ("Agreement") we are agreeing to resolve any Claim for medical malpractice by flic dispute
solution process described in this Agreement Under this Agreement, you can pursue your Claim and seek damages, br
u are waiving your light to have it decided by a judge or jury.
-tide 2 Definitions
The term "we," "parties" or <cus" means you, (the Patient), and the Provider.
The term "Claim'" means one or more Malpractice Actions defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
(Utah Code 78-14-3(15))- Each party :nay use any legal process to resolve non-medical malpractice claims.
The term "Provider" means the physician, group or clinic and their employees, partners, associates, agents,
successors and estates.
The term "Patienf * or "you" means:
(1) you and any person who makes a Claim for care given to YOU, such as your heirs* your spouse, children,
parents or legal representatives, AND
(2) your unborn child or newborn child for care provided during the 12 months irrunedi&tely following
the date you sign this Agreement, or any person who-makes a Claim for care given to that unborn or newborn
child.
-tide 3 Dispute Resolution Options
Methods Available for Dispute Resolution, We agree to resolve any Claim by:
(1)
working directly with each other to try and find a solution that resolves the Claim, OR
(2)
using non-binding mediation (each of us will bear one-half of the costs); OR
(3)
using binding "arbitration as described m this Agreement.
You may choose to use any. or all of these methods to resolve your Claim.
Legal Counsel. Each of us may choose to berepresentedby legal counsel 'during .any stage of the dispute
resolution process, but each of us wall pay the fees and costs of our own attorney.
Arbitration—Pinal Resolution. If working with the Provider or using non-binding mediation does not
resolve your Claim, we agree thai your Claim, will be .resolved through binding arbitration. We both agree
feat the decision reached in binding arbitration will be final.
t i d e 4 How, to Arbitrate a Claim
Notice. To make a Claim under this Agreement, mail a written notice to the Provider by certified mail that
briefly describes the nature of your Claim (the "Notice"). If the Notice is sent to the Provider by certified mail v
will suspend (toll) the applicable statute of limitations during the dispute resolution process described in this
Agreement.
Arbitrators. "Within .30 days of receiving the Notice> the Provider will contact you. If you and the Provider
cannot resolve the Claim by working together or through mediation, we will start the prdfcess of choosing
arbitrators. There will be three arbitrators* unless we agree that a single arbitrator may resolve the Claim.
(1)
Appointed Arbitrators. You will appoint an arbitrator of your choosing and all Providers will jointly
appoint an arbitrator of their choosing.
(2)
Jointly-Selected Arbitrator. You and the Providers) will then jointly appoint an arbitrator (the "JointlySelected Arbitrator1'). If you and the Providers) caanot agree upon a Jointly-Selected
*
"'
Arbitrator, the arbitrators appointed by each of the parties "will choose the Jointly-Selected Arbitrator fro
list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah. If the arbitrators cannot
agree on a Jointly-Selected Arbitrator, either or both of us may request that a Utah court select an indivi<
from the lists described above. Each party will pay their own fees and costs in such an action. The Jointl
Selected Arbitrator will preside over the arbitration hearing and have all other powers of an arbitrator as
forth in the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
Arbitration Expenses. You will pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator you appoint and the Providers) w yj
pay the fees and costs of the sdbilrator the Providers) appoints. Each of us will also pay one-half of the fees
and expenses of the Jointly-Selected Arbitrator and any other expenses of the arbitration panel
Final and Binding Decision. A majority of the three arbitrators will make a final decision on the Claim. The
decision shall be consistent with the. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act.

All Claims May be Joined, Any person or entity thai could be appropriately named in a court proceeding ("Joine
Party") is entitled to participate in this arbitration as long as that person.or entity agrees to be bound by the
arbitration decision ("Joinder"). Joinder may also include Claims against persons or entities that provided care
prior to the signing date of this Agreement. A "Joined Party" does not participate in the selection of the arbitratebut is considered a "Provider" for all other purposes of this Agreement,
t i d e 5 Liability and Damages May Be Arbitrated Separately
the request of either party, the issues of liability and damages will be arbitrated separately. If the arbitration panel fine
>ility> the parties may agree to either continue to arbitrate damages with the-initial panel or either party may cause that
ond panel be selected for considering damages. However, if a second panel is selected, the Jointly Selected arbitrator
3 remain the same and will continue to preside over the arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise.
t i d e 6 Venue / Governing Law
e arbitration healings will be held in a place agreed to by the parties. If the parties cannot agree, thehearings will be he
Salt Lake City, Utah. Arbitration proceedings are private and shall be kept confidential The provisions of the Utah
iferm Arbitration Act and die Federal Arbitration Act govern this Agreement. We hereby waive the prelitigaiion pane
lew requirements. - The arbitrators will apportion fault to all persons or entities that contributed to the injury claimed tr
t Patient, whether or not those persons or entities are parties to the arbitration.
•tide 7 Term / Rescission / Termination
Term. This Agreement is binding on both of us for one year from the date yon'sign it unless yon rescind it If i}
not rescinded, it will automatically renew every year unless either party notifies the other in writing of a decisionterminate it
Rescission. You may rescind this Agreement within 10 days.of signing it by sending written notice hy registered
certified mail to the Provider, The effective date of the rescission notice will be the date the rescission is
postmarked If not rescinded, this Agreement will govern all medical services received by the Patient from Provi
after the date of signing, except in the case of a Joined Party that provided care prior to the signing of this agreem
(see Article 4(E)).
Termination. If the Agreement has not been rescinded, either party may still terminate it at any time, but
termination will not take effect until the next anniversary of the signing of the Agreement To terminate this
Agreement, send written notice by registered or certified mail to the Provider. This Agreement applies to any Cla
that arises while it is in effect, even if you file a Claim or reqnest arbitration after the Agreement has been
terminated.
.rticleS Severability
r
any part of this Agreement is held to be invalid or. unenforceable, the remaining provisions will remain in Ml force ai? *
'ill not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision.
article 9 Acknowledgement of Written Explanation of Arbitration
have received a written explanation of the terms of this Agreement I have had therightto ask questions and have my
[uestions answered. I understand that any Claim I might have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process in
his Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner i
vhich they are selected. I understand the responsibility for arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement
'eiie\tfs*eaclryear Mnless cancelled before the reifew&l date. I understahdlhat'I can decline "to- enter into the Agreement an
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this Agreement within 10 days of signing it
Article 10 Receipt of Copy I have received a copy of this document

Provider

Charles Bova, MD
Christopher Caldwell, DO
Howard Loomis, DO

/? /

/

ISlanie of Physician, Group or Clinic

Kame of Patient (Print)

o3y:

_
Signature of Patient or Patient's Representative (Date

.
_
Signature of Physician or Authorized Agent

ADDENDUM
4

CLARK NEWHALL (#7091)
CHERIK. GOCHBERG (#8186)
Law Office of Clark Newhall MD ID
57 W. 200 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-8888
Fax: (801) 596-8888
cnewhall@cnewhall. com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 0 1 2010
SALI LAKE COUWfT
By.
Deputy Clerk

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLENNA STEWART
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES BOVA MD and PIONEER
VALLEY HOSPITAL
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT BOVA'S MOTION TO
STAY PROCEEDINGS AND COMPEL
ARBITRATION
Case No. 090900273
SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION
Judge Kennedy

The Court heard arguments on defendant Bova's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel
Arbitration on 6/15/09 and ordered supplemental briefing on whether the lack of a date on the
arbitration agreement rendered it unenforceable. The Court heard further argument on 10/19/09
and, being fully advised in the matter, makes the following Order:
The Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration is denied. The
plaintiff will prepare an Order and Memorandum of Decision.

The Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Appeal is due in five days, The
plaintiff may submit a responsive brief five days after the Motion is filed The defendant may
submit a reply brief five days after plaintiffs brief is filed The Court makes a preliminary
ruling that discovery should proceed.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The following issues were presented for decision:
Was the arbitration agreement signed before the allegedly negligent procedure?
Was the plaintiff "verbally encouraged" to read the written information and ask
questions?
The Court declined to decide the first issue. The Court determined that the second issue
was a matter of law and was dispositive of this motion.
The arbitration statute U.C.A §78B-3-421 (1) (c) (formerly and at the time this dispute
arose U.C.A §78-14-17) requires that 'for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and
a health care provider to be validly executed" . . . "the patient shall be verbally encouraged" to
read the written information and ask questions.
Plaintiff asserted in her declaration that no such verbal encouragement occurred prior to
the allegedly negligent procedure, She stated "No one asked me if I had any questions, or
encouraged me to ask questions regarding any of the documents I signed/'
Defendant asserted by affidavit that "I answered any of Mrs. Stewart's questions
regarding the arbitration agreement and confirmed that Mrs. Stewart understood the terms of the

arbitration agreement and that if we had a dispute related to the procedure, the dispute would be
addressed in arbitration."
The Court finds that defendant's affidavit is insufficient to create an issue of fact as to
whether or not he verbally encouraged plaintiff as required by the statute. The Court determines,
as a matter of law, that the phrase in the signed arbitration agreement stating "I have had the
right to ask questions and have my questions answered" does not satisfy the requirement of the
statute that the patient be "verbally encouraged/' Therefore, the Court finds that there is no issue
of fact to resolve in determining this motion. The Court finds that there is no proof that
defendant "verbally encouraged" the patient as required by statute.
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the party seeking to enforce a contract such as an
arbitration agreement bears the burden of proving its validity. "Most contracts bind only those
who bargain for them, and the burden of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all
material terms and conditions is on the party claiming that there is a contract, Arbitration
agreements are not exempt from this rule." Bvbee v. Abdulla. 189 P.3d 40, 43 (Utah, 2008)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)
Each of the three elements of subsection (1) of the statute is required before an arbitration
agreement can be "validly executed." The defendant, who is seeking to enforce this agreement,
cannot prove that his conduct met one of the three elements of the statute, the requirement of
subsection (l)(c) that "the patient shall be verbally encouraged" to ask questions.
The defendant argues that the declaration of plaintiff is insufficient to alter the terms of
the contract, because the contractual terms are unambiguous and therefore are not subject to

alteration by extrinsic or parol evidence. The Court is not persuaded by this argument because
the argument assumes that the contract in question is valid. The Court has determined that this is
not a valid contract because it does not meet the statutory requirements uto be validly executed,"
Therefore, as a matter of law, there is no contract between the parties and no terms to which the
Court must apply parol or extrinsic evidence.
/s/
^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ X D a t e
Hon. John
Judse, ThiMpistricb^ouft^ £
Prepared by:

\^;-:^-AA
/J-j?
V '*^X><\>Vy

QyUJl KW^i^
CLARK NEWHALL
Attorney for Plaintiff
Approved as to form:
/s/ refused to sign Date
Steve Hester
Kurt Frankenburg
Williams & Hunt
Attorneys for defendant Bova
I si no response received Date
Ken Reich
Brian Miller
Snow Christensen & Martineau
Attomevs for defendant Pioneer Valley
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on/^M^)

(

^

2

^ 9 _

j caused a ^

^ correct

copy of the above and foregoing to be served by depositing in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Brian Miller
Snow Christiansen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84145
Attorney for Pioneer Valley Hospital

Kurt Frankenburg
Williams & Hunt
PO Box 45678
257 E. 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City UT 84145-5678
Attorney for Charles Bova

Legal Assistant
/
Law Office of Clark Newhall MD JD

